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Security in the balance: How Britain tried to keep its Iraq War secrets 
 
State secrecy is incompatible with the values of liberal democracy if there is no 
publicly reasonable justification for the concealment. So how can a liberal democracy 
continue to keep state secrets amidst suspicion that no such justification exists or 
that, worse, those secrets contain evidence of wrongdoing? This paper maps and 
critiques the justificatory strategies used by the British state to refuse to disclose 
secret material related to the 2003 Iraq War, despite widespread accusations of 
hidden deception and illegality. Through an analysis of the legal discourse that 
underpins freedom of information and disclosure protocols, the paper shows how 
the law regulates disclosure through a metaphorical ‘balance’ of public interests. This 
balance, however, is no balance at all. It is profoundly one-sided because security 
only features on one side. The law explicitly recognizes that disclosure can create 
insecurity for public interests, but lacks any recognition of the opposite: the insecurity 
of secrecy. Rather than security trumping liberal values, this law allows enduring 
secrecy to be framed, paradoxically, as a means to secure liberal democratic 
accountability. The significance of this claim is far-reaching as FOI laws in many 
other countries employ a similar harm-based, one-sided justificatory strategy. 
 
Introduction  
 
‘Suppression is the instrument of a totalitarian dictatorship; we don’t talk of that sort 
of thing in a free country! We simply take a democratic decision not to publish.’ 
- Sir Humphrey Appleby, fictional civil servant in the British television series Yes 
Minister (Jay and Lynn, 1981). 
 
Secrecy is dangerous. Despite a global growth in freedom of information (FOI) laws, there 
remains a concern that state secrecy is abused to conceal mistakes and wrongdoing (Sagar, 
2013; Roberts, 2006; Bail, 2015). But there are also many good reasons for secrecy, such as 
the protection of national security, individual liberty, economic activities and political 
negotiation (Bok, 1989; Luban, 1996; Chambers, 2004). An inescapable tension is that state 
actors conceal official information on the grounds that doing so protect the values of 
democratic self-government and security, yet those very same values are endangered by 
concealment (Curtin, 2014).  
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This tension was exemplified in the dispute over the disclosure of state secrets about Britain’s 
decision to participate in the 2003 Iraq War. It was repeatedly alleged that the Blair 
Government misled the public about the reasons for war. This generated repeated demands, 
via public inquiries and FOI requests, for the publication of official information. Despite this 
pressure, successive governments refused to disclose some material. The executive claimed 
that some classes of information (such as diplomatic exchanges and records of Cabinet) that 
should, in theory, be accessible under FOI law could, in practice, never be disclosed because 
the future consequences of disclosure would be too harmful to the public interest. Successive 
government have defended this argument, even vetoing judicial orders for disclosure. This 
is a form of exceptionalism: arbitrary decisions to deviate from a self-professed liberal-
democratic norm of disclosure, justified as an act of precautionary risk management against 
the possible future harms of disclosure (Aradau and Van Munster, 2009: 688, 694). 
 
A puzzle ensues: if official secrecy is defended on the grounds that it protects the public interest, how can 
this justification stand if there is widespread suspicion that the secret contains evidence of wrongdoing against 
the public? The paradoxical answer, in the above words of the consummate bureaucrat Sir 
Humphrey, is that the refusal to disclose material must appear to be a ‘democratic decision’. 
This paper explains the strategies used by the British state to justify exceptional secrecy, not 
as a suspension of liberal democratic principles but as a performance of them. Yet this move 
relies on a peculiar securitisation of information that ultimately undermines democratic 
deliberation.  
 
Whether or not state secrecy is a problem depends upon the theoretical lens applied. The 
first section of the paper reviews three standpoints on state secrecy, each present in 
contemporary public discourse. First, raison d’État (or reason of state) frames disclosure as a 
threat to national security — a refrain often used by authorities, most notably intelligence 
agencies, to defend concealment. Second, classical liberals frame state secrecy as a threat to 
individual security — a popular argument with transparency campaigners who link disclosure 
to the deterrence of defective government. Not only are these two approaches irreconcilable, 
they also both rely on the projection of insecurity. Third, deliberative democrats resolve this 
tension by recognising that liberal democracy can be harmed by both excessive secrecy and 
disclosure. Deliberative democrats propose that limited state secrecy is compatible with 
liberal democratic principles so long as there is a publicly acceptable reason for both the 
secret activity and the subsequent concealment. This compromise broadly reflects the 
contemporary justification for state secrecy in liberal democracies: the state relies on an 
implicit validity claim that it could reveal and justify itself in accordance with public reason 
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if called to do so. What makes Britain’s refusal to disclose its Iraq War secrets puzzling is that 
it appears to be an exception to this validity claim. The secrets were kept despite widespread 
suspicion that they contained evidence of wrongdoing and despite repeated calls for 
disclosure from FOI campaigners, the judiciary, and an official public inquiry. 
 
The paper then examines how UK information rights law, especially the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), smooths over this tension. Disputes over disclosure are settled 
through a ‘public interest test’, which requires the state to ‘balance’ the public interests for 
and against disclosure. This suggests both sides have an equal chance of winning the debate, 
subject to the strength of their evidence. Yet this balance is not a balance at all. It is 
profoundly one-sided. There is an explicit acknowledgement in law that disclosure poses 
harm to the common good, but the law does not recognise the obverse: the possible harm 
to liberal governance posed by secrecy. Insecurity only features on one side of the equation: 
the insecurity of disclosure. The insecurity of secrecy is not recognised. The significance of this claim 
is far-reaching. FOI laws now exist in over one hundred countries (Luscombe and Walby, 
2017: 379), and many of these laws employ a similarly harm-based, one-sided justificatory 
strategy.i  
 
Finally, the paper examines two examples to demonstrate how this legal discourse justifies 
the refusal of disclosure requests — first, correspondence between Tony Blair and George 
Bush, and second, minutes of Cabinet Meetings from March 2003. The examples have three 
notable features. First, continued secrecy was associated with security; disclosure was 
associated with risk and insecurity. The refusal to disclose the material was justified as a 
measure to secure the public interest against potential harms, such as the loss of diplomatic 
relationships or poor decision-making. The potential harms of non-disclosure such as the 
concealment of deception, private gain or incompetence were not given the same 
recognition. Second, secrecy was not justified by an appeal to security over liberty or as an 
emergency curtailment of democracy. Rather, this is a transparent process in which certain 
public values (such as precautionary harm-avoidance) are afforded greater visibility than 
others (Barnett, 2015). The refusal to disclose information was framed as a measure to secure 
liberal democratic governance itself: fearless deliberation, public understanding, and 
accountability. Finally, the examples highlight the messy and fragile nature of this 
exceptionalism. After years of dispute and public pressure, the government reluctantly gave 
permission for some of the material to be disclosed in a redacted form via a public inquiry 
(the Iraq ‘Chilcot’ Inquiry). By publishing the material through this non-statutory inquiry, 
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however, disclosure did not change legal precedent – thereby maintaining the lawfulness of 
future refusals.  
 
The paper offers the following original insights. First, significant attention has been paid to 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of disclosure versus concealment (Fung et al., 
2007; Colaresi 2014; Lester, 2015), but less attention has been paid to the legal discourses 
that shape how decisions to disclose are actually made. The issue is not only that the law 
authorises the executive to judge the potential harms caused by disclosure (Sagar, 2013: 4), 
but that this harm-based discourse is itself problematic. Second, showing how decisions are 
made contributes to a growing interest in the enactment of secrecy (Kearns, 2017; de Goede 
and Wesseling, 2017; Walters and Luscombe, 2017). The paper shows how such decisions 
rely on balance metaphors and specific articulations of risk, which have been shown 
elsewhere to underpin exceptional states policies that would otherwise violate liberal 
democratic values (Waldron, 2003; Neocleous, 2007; Bigo, 2010; Stavrianakis, 2018). This 
explains how FOI can appear, simultaneously, as a mechanism of accountability and 
obfuscation (Luscombe and Walby, 2017). Such obfuscation should be concerning for 
security researchers, who use FOI information legislation to uncover harmful or illegal covert 
policies (Raphael et al., 2016).  
 
Despite emphasising the imbalance of security in the law, the paper concludes by warning 
against a new or better balance between the harms of disclosure and nondisclosure. Doing 
so would reduce disclosure debates entirely to a zero-sum game of security trumps, to the 
detriment of democracy. Transparency, as de Goede and Wesseling (2017) have noted, 
should not be conflated with meaningful scrutiny of the value and effectiveness of security 
practices. Only by shifting the debate back to the question of democratic values, rather than 
harm-avoidance, can this scrutiny be achieved.      
 
The problem of secrecy in a liberal democracy  
 
The political debate on state secrecy often follows the pattern — familiar to Critical Security 
Studies— of framing secrecy as either a threat to political life or a tool to protect that way of 
life from other threats (Huysmans, 1998b). The doctrine of raison d’État frames secrecy as a 
tool of security for the state. Classical liberals, meanwhile, frame disclosure as a tool of security 
against an incompetent or ill-intentioned government. The result is a stalemate of conflicting 
security-based arguments, both of which can be highly detrimental to democracy. Deliberative 
democrats address this impasse by claiming that state secrecy is legitimate on the promise that 
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what goes on in secret could withstand public scrutiny and should be disclosed if that 
promise is called into question. This approach is largely reflected in FOI legislation. What 
makes the concealment of Britain’s Iraq War secrets unsettling is that it occurs despite a 
widespread suspicion of wrongdoing (thereby breaking the promise that what goes on in 
secret could withstand public scrutiny), threatens to undo the deliberative democratic 
compromise and void the democratic character of the state.  
 
First, the modern debate on disclosure would not exist without raison d’État. This art of 
government — which emerged in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries — 
created the need for state secrecy. It did so by making the ‘state’ a statistical reality. 
Government became concerned with gathering knowledge of the state, such as assets, 
wealth, technology and population. This knowledge made it possible to calculate future 
action – such as whether a state could successfully wage war. The reliability of these 
calculations could be improved by obtaining knowledge through espionage and surveillance. 
Across Europe, this rationality gave rise to the ‘Black Chambers’ of early Cryptology. 
Stealing, intercepting and maintaining these mysteries of the state (arcana imperii) became ‘an 
essential tool of security’ (Horn, 2011: 108, Foucault, 2007: 255-283). Political secrecy was 
claimed as part of the common good – protecting the state and the population therein 
(Erskine, 2004). This rationality persists, as Sir John Sawers – former ‘C’ of the Secret 
Intelligence Service – recently remarked. 
 
Secret intelligence …deepens our understanding of a foreign country or grouping 
…reveals their very intentions…[and] gives us new opportunities for action… Political 
secrecy is not a dirty word… Political secrecy plays a crucial part in keeping Britain 
safe and secure. (Sawers, 2010, emphasis added) 
 
Thus, publicity would unequivocally harm the intelligence gathering cycle. This was 
demonstrated by the 1927 Arcos Affair in which British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin read 
aloud from deciphered Soviet telegrams, prompting the Russian government to adopt a new 
encryption system. British intelligence chiefs claimed that the recent Snowden leaks had a 
similar effect, producing a ‘sudden darkening’ that has resulted from ‘our targets… discussing 
the revelations …discussing how to avoid what they now perceive to be vulnerable 
communications methods’ (Lobban, 2013: 17) It is for this reason that states often argue that 
security services should have an absolute exemption from FOI laws.  
 
But political secrecy introduces a new danger: a space of exception, hidden from ordinary 
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law, which a ‘devilish’ sovereign could abuse to advance private interests (Viroli, 1992: 273-
274; Horn, 2011: 106). An ordinary citizen could not know whether these prerogative powers 
were being used for or against the common good. By the mid-nineteenth century, the tools 
of raison d'État were derided by British liberals as unconstitutional and ‘un-English’ methods 
of authoritarianism that jarred with principles of ‘free’ Britain (Vincent 1999: 9). A ‘liberalism 
of fear’ held that behind every secret was an abuse of power (Shklar, 2004: 158; Foucault, 
1980b: 153).  Political secrecy thus helped to secure the state against one uncertainty, only to 
introduce another.  
 
This leads to the second position, found in the work of some classical liberals, that 
government transparency enhances the security of liberal democratic life. Jeremy Bentham was the 
most vociferous advocate, although similar sentiments can be found in the work of both Mill 
and Madison (Colaresi, 2014: 42-45). Bentham could not understand why politics should not 
be conducted in public: ‘why should we hide’, he asked, ‘if we do not dread being seen?’ 
(Bentham, 1843a: 310). A transparent politics in which politicians were given the impression 
of constant surveillance would, Bentham believed, deter corrupt interests and provide ‘a 
security against improper conduct’ (Bentham, 1843b: 302). By forcing speakers to rely on 
publicly defensible arguments, ‘sound opinions will be more common’ (Bentham, 1843a: 
311). Bentham and other liberals believed that government behind closed doors could never, 
even with the best intentions, possess the knowledge necessary to respond correctly to every 
eventuality (Simons, 1995: 57). Instead, conducting the business of government in public 
view would allow the citizenry to regulate against ‘too much government’ (Foucault, 2008: 
77), which might otherwise stifle or mismanage economic and social practices.  
 
The rhetoric of information rights campaigners has often invoked this Benthamite claim. 
During the interwar period, one of the first pro-transparency political movements — the 
Union for Democratic Control — argued that ‘frankness and publicity are better securities 
for peace than secrecy and intrigue’ (cited in Swartz, 1971: 223). Decades later, the British 
Campaign for Freedom of Information argued that ‘secrecy leads to poor policy-making and 
to injustice to individuals’ (Chapman, 1987: 25). When the New Labour government 
introduced FOI legislation, it announced that a culture of unnecessary secrecy was leading 
to ‘arrogance in governance’ and ‘defective decision-making’ (Cabinet Office, 1998: 2).  
 
Yet this securitisation of secrecy can be just as damaging to democracy as the abuses of 
power that transparency is supposed to prevent. As one former intelligence official observed, 
‘secrets are like sex. Most of us think that others get more than we do. Some of us cannot 
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have enough of either. Both encourage fantasy’ (Braithwaite, 2003). This fantasy, coupled 
with the liberal fear of secrecy, reduces liberal politics to a never-ending quest for revelation 
(Birchall, 2011b: Horn, 2011). No matter how much disclosure takes place, the suspicion of 
a guilty secret remains (Dean 2001: 631). The British case for war against Iraq, for instance, 
was premised upon the claim that the secretive nature of Saddam’s regime could only be 
explained as an attempt to hide a guilty secret — weapons of mass destruction. The British 
government portrayed Iraq’s secretive behaviour as demonstrative of an urgent threat, 
thereby closing down debate and hastening war (Thomas 2017: 379). Transparency is not an 
act of resistance against power but the enactment of different power relations.  
 
Deliberative democrats offer an alternative to these security-based arguments of raison 
d’État and classical liberalism. They focus instead on the conditions that facilitate well-
reasoned decisions and a ‘deliberative accountability’ under which citizens and officials 
‘justify their decisions to all those who are bound to them’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 
128). In doing so, they recognise that both transparency and secrecy can damage liberal 
democratic politics. First, while transparency may force speakers to rely on publicly 
defensible arguments, these arguments can succumb to ‘plebiscitary reason’ (Chambers, 
2004: 389). Such arguments do not reflect the speaker’s genuine beliefs but are chosen to 
appeal to the broadest majority and the lowest denominator (Elster, 1998: 109-111). 
Plebiscitary arguments are usually shallow and poorly reasoned, and easily support crude 
majoritarian, intolerant or prejudiced policies that violate liberal democratic principles of 
respect for the individual. By contrast, if deliberation takes place in secret, participants may 
be more likely to speak candidly, change their position in response to better arguments or 
make compromises without worrying about losing face (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 
115-17; Bok, 1989: 175-187; Morgenthau 2005: 155-58, 373-74). In this sense, some 
justifications for state secrecy and individual privacy are analogous in a liberal democracy 
(Westin, 1967: 46). Liberal democracy is founded on secrets: whether it is the vote in a ballot 
box or the provision of a private space in which to make decisions, secrecy provides the 
permissive conditions for participants to make policy according to the ‘force of better 
argument’ (Habermas, 1996: 305).  Second, secrecy deters plebiscitary reason but increases 
the threat of ‘private reason’ upon which the liberalism of fear is based (Chambers 2004: 
391), where participants abandon the force of better argument in favour of bargains for 
personal gain or for reasons that are too narrow to be publicly acceptable.  
 
Deliberative theorists, therefore, place two conditions on the use of secrecy in liberal 
democratic government. First, decisions made in secret must always be capable of 
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withstanding public scrutiny. This means that, behind closed doors, decision-makers should 
act ‘as if’ their deliberations were subject to public scrutiny (see Luban, 1996 on Kant’s 
publicity principle). The reasons for those decisions should normally be accessible and 
understandable to the citizenry, who ought to be respected as autonomous agents who take 
part by scrutinising this reason-giving process. Second, if the decision-making process relies 
upon secret evidence, good reasons for that secrecy must be given and opportunities to check the 
evidence must be provided later on. This applies to the evidence upon which a decision may 
rest — e.g. checking the validity of secret intelligence. But it also applies to the decision-
making process itself – e.g. checking that deliberation was competent, sincerely intended to 
benefit the common good, and that the reasons agreed upon in private accurately reflect the 
reasons given in public (Gutmann and Thompson, 2004: 4-6). This latter check also guards 
against deception and ‘self-deception’ (Galeotti, 2015).   
 
This conditional approval of state secrecy is reflected in the broad principles of information 
rights legislation — such as FOIA. The act allows any person to request official information 
and have that information communicated to them unless the state can give good reasons for 
refusing disclosure. If the requester and the state disagree over whether the reasons for 
refusing disclosure are acceptable, the judiciary offers an independent verdict via an appeals 
process. Even when requests are denied, the vast majority of official information is published 
after twenty or thirty years via the Public Records Act — giving citizens an eventual 
opportunity to check decision and policy-making processes. Legitimate political secrecy, to 
summarise, is predicated upon explicit validity claims that good reasons for the secret exist 
and that the state could justify its behaviour in accordance with these reasons. The need to 
disclose the content of a political secret arises if that promise is put in doubt.  
 
A paradigmatic example of this doubt was the widespread suspicion that the British 
Government had misled the public about the basis for war in 2003. In the years following 
the war — despite vociferous denials by the government — suspicions abound that the 
Prime Minister had ignored legal advice, disregarded Cabinet and manipulated intelligence 
to obtain public support for the war. In these circumstances, the liberal democratic character 
of the state is redeemed by checking the government’s validity claim that no wrongdoing 
occurred and/or that there remain good reasons to continue to conceal official records 
pertaining to the decision to go to war. What makes Britain’s enduring Iraq War secrets 
problematic is that they appear to be an exception to this deliberative democratic validity 
claim. Despite calls from citizens, an official inquiry and the judiciary, the government has 
refused to disclose some information. This refusal would place the liberal democratic identity 
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of the state in jeopardy unless, paradoxically, it could find an equally liberal democratic 
justification for the exception. A peculiarity of the law opens up this possibility.  
 
How the law makes exceptional secrecy appear reasonable  
 
The exception is made possible because information rights law recognises the potential 
harms of disclosure but not the potential harms of secrecy. This imbalance allows the state 
to justify enduring secrecy, even when its validity claim of ‘good reasons’ is in doubt. It is 
made possible by three components of freedom of information legislation: the historical 
legacy of the Official Secrets Act, the public interest test, and the reliance upon the concept 
of harm.  
 
The principle that disclosure is potentially harmful first appeared in law in the Official Secrets 
Act (OSA) 1889. At the time, the government justified the OSA as a means to protect 
national security against German espionage. However the OSA was also a response to 
another problem: poorly paid, secretarial clerks were selling state secrets to the press (Moran, 
2012: 31-32). The OSA solved this problem by criminalising unsanctioned disclosures that 
were contrary to ‘the interest of the state, or otherwise in the public interest’ (Vincent, 1991: 
238). The OSA enshrined in law the expectation that disclosure could threaten the public 
interest and simultaneously quashed the Fourth Estate’s counter-claim that the public 
interest could be served by exposing the state. 
 
Not until the latter half of the twentieth century was reform of the secret state given serious 
consideration. In 1958 the Public Records Act mandated the transfer of most official records 
and papers to the Public Records Office after a 30-year period.  Ten years later, the Fulton 
Report criticised the excessive use of official secrecy in the British state to the detriment of 
good government. With the end of the Cold War, the Major government released over one 
hundred thousand hitherto concealed papers under the Waldegrave initiative and publicly 
acknowledged the existence of the Secret Intelligence Service (HC Deb 6 May 1992, c64). 
Eventually, New Labour introduced the Freedom of Information Act in 2000, granting a 
public right of access to information held by public authorities. Yet even though campaigners 
repeatedly linked disclosure with security, this was never formally recognised in law. The 
FOIA, as will be shown below, retained the OSA’s presumption that disclosure was always 
a potential threat to the public interest.   
 
The public interest test: what public interest?  
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Law, like any discourse, is composed of specific concepts that speakers must use for their 
talk to be legitimate (Foucault, 2002: 55-61). One such concept is the public interest test. 
This mechanism can be found in all sorts of laws and protocols that regulate disclosure (such 
as the FOIA, Public Interest Immunity and the disclosure protocols for a public inquiry). 
The process of requesting information can be simplified into the flowchart below. First, a 
person (or ‘requester’) asks an authority for official information. Second, if the authority 
holds that information and the request is not prohibitively expensive or vexatious, the 
requester should have the information communicated to her unless the information is covered 
by an exemption. There are two types of exemption: absolute and qualified. If the 
information is covered by an absolute exemption, the authority can refuse the request and 
refuse to confirm or deny whether the information exists at all (e.g. information pertaining 
to the security services). If the information is covered by a qualified exemption, the authority 
must make the decision according to the public interest test. The test is set out in section 
1(1) as follows: 
 
Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled… to have 
that information communicated to him. [This entitlement] does not apply if … the 
public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing 
the information. 
 
In plain English, this means that the authority must identify and weigh the public interests 
for and against disclosure. The authority can only withhold the information if the public 
interests in maintaining the exemption outweigh the public interests in disclosure. If the 
public interests in disclosure are greater or equal to the public interests in exemption, the 
information must be disclosed. For this reason, the UK’s independent regulatory authority 
for information rights — the Information Commissioner’s Office — claims that within the 
FOIA is ‘there is an assumption in favour of disclosure’ (ICO, 2018: 5). However, this is not 
accurate because the balance of public interests is not a balance at all. It is profoundly one-
sided because the law only defines the ‘public interest’ in terms of specific governmental and 
societal activities that could be harmed by disclosure. There is no corresponding 
acknowledgement of how the state or society could be harmed by non-disclosure.  
 
FIGURE ONE HERE 
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‘Public Interest’ is an unavoidably ambiguous term, because it depends on a judgement about 
the values and principles of the public good or, put differently, what is understood to be in 
the best interests of society. The term is an empty signifier, much like ‘security’. The FOIA, 
however, gives the term specific meaning by stipulating public interest arguments that can 
be used to deny a request. In the parlance of securitisation, each ‘public interest’ is a referent 
object of security that could be damaged by disclosure. An authority can use the exemption 
if it judges that disclosure would, or would likely, cause enough harm to outweigh the public 
interests in disclosure.ii For instance, an authority can refuse a request if disclosure would: 
 
- Cause a specific harm to the formation of government policy, section 35(1)(a). 
- Cause a specific harm to ministerial communication, section 35(1)(b). 
- Cause a specific harm to a criminal investigation, section 30. 
- Prejudice the economy in a specific instance, section 29. 
- Prejudice international relations in a specific instance, section 27(1). 
- Prejudice national security in a specific instance, section 24. 
 
There is no corresponding list of public interest arguments giving reasons for disclosure. As 
is often the case, the benefits of disclosure are assumed to be self-evident (Fenster, 2015). 
Some reasons have been established through case law: a public interest in accountability, 
public understanding and involvement in the democratic process; a public interest in 
understanding information and advice used by the government to make decisions; and a 
public interest investigating suspicion of wrongdoing (ICO, 2018: 11-15). This last reason 
mirrors the deliberative democratic argument: disclosure may either refute a suspicion or 
provide a ‘smoking gun’ to prove that the suspicion was justified (ICO, 2018: 14). These pro-
disclosure arguments, however, are not explicitly linked to the avoidance of harm in the same 
way as the prescribed public interests above. The public interests in exemption are security-
based arguments; the public interests in disclosure are vague democracy-based arguments. The 
former trumps the latter. 
 
Harm and the myth of ‘balance’ 
 
This imbalance is compounded because the law encourages authorities to consider how the 
public interest ‘would, or would be likely’ harmed by disclosure in the future (e.g. section 27, 
emphasis added). Since 1996, the law on harm has been informed by a principle that it would 
be ‘impossible in advance to describe … damage exhaustively’ and while ‘[n]ormally it will 
be in the form of direct and immediate harm’ it is also to be expected that some harms will 
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be ‘indirect or longer-term’, only appearing through long-term consequences that cannot be fully 
understood or predicted at the time of disclosure (cited in Beer, 2011: 198, emphasis added). 
An authority need only identify a ‘logical connection’ between disclosure and the harm, and 
given that the potential harm ‘relates to something that may happen in the future …it is not 
usually possible to provide concrete proof that the prejudice would or would be likely to 
result’ (ICO, 2013). This position resembles the ‘epistemological crisis’ more readily visible 
in counter-terrorism policy – whereby uncertainty is governed through pre-emptive action 
and the institutionalisation of imagination (Jackson, 2015: 35). The FOIA encourages 
authorities to imagine a future danger that represents a ‘passage to the limit’ of the political 
(Huysmans, 1998a: 581). Those who favour disclosure do not have the opposing entitlement 
– to articulate the insecurity of secrecy. The competing public interests in the so-called 
balance occupy different planes – they are not equally knowable. Advocates for secrecy are 
defending the existing state of affairs; advocates for disclosure seeking the becoming of a 
new (and presumed potentially harmful) reality.  
 
This one-sided emphasis on harm unravels the pretence that the public interest test ‘balances’ 
arguments for and against disclosure. ‘Balance’ implies that two opposing objects can be 
quantified like two objects on a set of scales, giving speakers on both sides of a dispute an 
equal chance of winning the debate, subject to the strength of their evidence. However, this 
balance is unequal because the opposing public interests are not quantified in the same terms.  
 
This argument has been made in relation to the so-called balance of liberty versus security 
(Waldron, 2003: 205; Luban 2005: 245-247; Bigo, 2010: 392-401). The relationship between 
liberty and security is messy and contingent. A political judgment is required to codify the 
relationship and give weighting to the terms. The notion of a zero-sum balance between liberty 
and security is just one possible codification – made possible by placing harm on one side of 
the equation. An excess of liberty, on these terms, poses potential harm to security, and 
security, in turn, is assumed to underwrite the conditions for liberty. An alternative 
codification is that a reduction in liberty diminishes the security of citizen against the excesses 
of state power, but this argument is neutralised by the location of harm solely as the harm-of-
liberty to security.  
 
The public interest test is derivative of this framing. The balance is between the public 
interest in disclosure versus the harm that disclosure would cause to the public interest – or 
put differently, the norm of disclosure is outweighed by the harm of adhering to that norm. 
As described above, the relationship between disclosure and security can be codified in 
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different ways: for raison d’État, disclosure represents a threat to state security; for classical 
liberals, security (of the individual) is achieved through transparency; for deliberative 
democrats, a political community’s best interests are preserved through the quality of 
democracy and this can be harmed by either excessive transparency or secrecy. Describing 
the public interest test as a ‘balance’ obscures an acknowledgement of the chosen 
codification (Bigo, 2010: 399). Under the present arrangement, insecurity only features on 
one side of the equation: the insecurity of disclosure. The insecurity of secrecy is not 
recognised. 
 
To illustrate this further, consider what happens if we invert the public interest test. Doing 
so can make the effects of a discursive formation clearer. Here is how the FOIA currently 
describes the public interest test and the specific exemption related to international relations:  
 
Any person making a request for information to a public authority is entitled… to have 
that information communicated to him. [This entitlement] does not apply if … the 
public interest in maintaining [secrecy] outweighs the public interest in disclosing the 
information (Section 1:1).  
 
…Information is exempt information if its disclosure …would, or would be likely to, 
prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and any other State (Section 27:1).   
 
Now, consider how this excerpt appears inverted (the changes are underlined): 
 
Any public authority receiving a request for information by a person is entitled to 
refuse to communicate that information to her. [This entitlement] does not apply if … 
the public interest in [disclosure] outweighs the public interest in not disclosing the 
information 
 
… Information is exempt information if its non-disclosure … would, or would be 
likely to, prejudice relations between the United Kingdom and any other State 
 
The original excerpt states that a person can expect disclosure unless the interest in disclosure 
is outweighed by the interest in avoiding a likely harm to Britain’s international relations. The 
second excerpt states that an authority can expect to refuse disclosure unless the interest in 
refusing is outweighed by the interest in avoiding harm likely to be caused by that refusal. 
The difference is whether secrecy underwrites security by offering protection for specific public 
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interests or threatens security by endangering those interests (as it would under the inversion). 
The inversion shows how the test is unequal because harm resides only on one side.   
 
Justifying secrecy: cases from the Iraq War inquiry  
 
It was repeatedly alleged that senior figures within the British government misled parliament 
and the public about the justification and necessity for participating in the 2003 Iraq War 
(e.g. Short, 2004). This suspicion of wrongdoing generated repeated demands for the 
publication of official records and documentation. Official disclosure took place in two ways. 
First, members of the public submitted FOI requests for material that was known or 
suspected to exist. Second, British governments appointed a series of public inquiries 
culminating in the Iraq Inquiry – led by Sir John Chilcot. From 2009-2016, the inquiry had 
complete access to government archives and reviewed more than 150,000 documents (Iraq 
Inquiry, 2016: 10). No material, however, was publicly available unless Chilcot could 
convince the government to declassify and disclose specific documentation. iii  
 
The following section examines two instances where the inquiry and FOI requesters sought 
disclosure of significant documents: first, the records of written and verbal communication 
between the former Prime Minister Tony Blair and the former U.S. President George Bush 
(dubbed the ‘Blair/Bush Exchanges’); and second, the minutes of Cabinet Meetings held in 
the months leading up to the invasion. In both cases, the FOI requests were refused and the 
inquiry’s requests were partially granted via an extra-legal compromise. This justification 
hinged on the paradoxical promise to protect the very same liberal democratic values that 
are transgressed by exceptional secrecy. 
 
The Blair/Bush exchanges  
 
One rumour surrounding the war was that Blair made a promise to support the American 
president, regardless of public or parliamentary support. Chilcot was eager to publish the 
Blair/Bush Exchanges to address this suspicion. In order to obtain disclosure of official 
information, the inquiry had to follow a protocol that was identical in language to the FOIA. 
The only difference was that the protocol was not legally binding. The inquiry would make 
requests to the Cabinet Office, who would apply the public interest test (Cabinet Office, 
2009). Writing to the Cabinet Secretary to request disclosure, Chilcot (2010) asserted that the 
exchanges contained ‘important, and often unique, insights into Mr Blair’s thinking and the 
commitments he made to President Bush’. Without disclosure, Chilcot claimed, the public 
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would not trust the inquiry’s findings and the inquiry would fail to resolve the suspicion of 
wrongdoing.   
 
The Cabinet Secretary, Gus O’Donnell, was not convinced by Chilcot’s arguments and 
refused the request based on the possible future harm of disclosure. First, O’Donnell (2011) 
replied that disclosure would likely damage the UK’s international relations. A future Prime 
Minister, O’Donnell wrote, ‘may be less likely to have these exchanges (or allow them to be 
recorded) if he is concerned that this information would be disclosed at a later time against 
his wishes’ and ‘[i]nhibiting this type of free and frank exchange would represent real 
prejudice to the UK’s relations with the US’. Second, O’Donnell judged that non-disclosure 
would protect democratic accountability because disclosure could prompt future Prime 
Ministers to hold such discussions ‘off the record’ thereby reducing the opportunity for 
future public scrutiny. O’Donnell’s decision was ‘generic’ insomuch as any disclosure from 
the exchanges, no matter how innocuous, could cause harm to these public interest – thereby 
rendering diplomatic exchanges subject to a permanent exception.  
 
It seemed that the exchanges would not see the light of day. But as Chilcot and O’Donnell 
argued, a citizen named Stephen Plowden filed an FOI request for the material, having 
learned about the exchanges during the inquiry’s public hearings. Plowden’s request was 
denied by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but the FOIA allows applicants to appeal 
the decision through three stages: the Information Commissioner, the Information Tribunal, 
and the Upper Tribunal. At each stage, attempts were made to mitigate the potential harms 
of disclosure so that the exchanges could be released. But each attempt failed.  
 
At first stage appeal, the Information Commissioner ordered the government to disclose the 
material with redactions for any part reflecting information provided by Bush. In the 
Commissioner’s view, there was a public interest in exposing such ‘paramount’ decisions to 
public scrutiny, and redaction could sufficiently reduce the harm posed to ‘free and frank’ 
diplomatic exchange (ICO, 2011). Both Plowden and the government appealed the 
Commissioner’s decision. At the second appeal, the Information Tribunal found that the 
Commissioner’s solution was unworkable, as both men often agreed on points together 
without identifying who originated the subject of discussion. Instead, the tribunal applied a 
‘sentence by sentence’ approach, redacting any sentence that posed sufficient harm to 
outweigh the public interest in disclosure, which the Information Tribunal identified as 
‘transparency about, and accountability for’ the decision to go to war (Angel, et al., 2012: 21). 
The government quickly appealed the decision.  
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Finally, the case was heard in the Upper Tribunal, who dismissed the sentence-by-sentence 
approach for two reasons. First, if a redacted version was disclosed, the audience would be 
aware of this and would attempt to infer what was missing. The resulting speculation was a 
potential harm of disclosure in its own right (Jacobs, 2013: 4). While the Upper Tribunal did 
not expand on the nature of this harm, they may have had in mind the damage that suspicion 
and distrust can pose to a democracy by making the public aware of secrecy, even when the 
content of the secret may be benign (Dean, 2001). Secondly, the Upper Tribunal concluded 
that the Information Tribunal had failed to explain how the benefits of disclosure 
outweighed its ‘detrimental effects’ – that is, how a public interest in transparency and 
accountability ‘could be set up against the interest in maintaining the exemptions’ – namely 
the preserving foreign alliances through diplomatic confidentiality. The Upper Tribunal 
expressed concern that the members of the Information Tribunal lacked personal experience 
of the diplomatic consequences of disclosure and ought, therefore, to rely more on the 
government’s ‘expertise and experience in relation to foreign policy matters as well as 
security’ (Jacobs, 2013: 4).  
 
The case returned to the Information Tribunal. With no option but to consider the 
exchanges as a whole, the tribunal struggled to mitigate the possible harms of disclosure. In 
a stark illustration of the executive’s symbolic advantage of residing behind the veil of 
secrecy, the tribunal determined that it ‘must give due respect’ to the experience and expertise 
of Foreign Office officials who claimed that the US would have been ‘upset and somewhat 
shocked’ if the exchanges were disclosed, thereby prejudicing the diplomatic relationship 
(Shanks, et al., 2014: 14). The tribunal refused disclosure. 
 
There was one final twist. Three months after Plowden’s defeat in the Information Tribunal, 
Gus O’Donnell retired. The new Cabinet Secretary, Jeremy Heywood, reconsidered Chilcot’s 
request. Heywood reluctantly accepted Chilcot’s plea to publish a redacted version of the 
exchanges in order to provide evidence for the inquiry’s conclusions. Heywood gave 
permission to disclose the ‘absolute minimum necessary’ from the UK side of the exchanges, 
using ‘gists’ where possible. This was palatable for Heywood only because the non-binding 
nature of the inquiry’s disclosure protocol would not set any future legal precedent for FOI 
requests (Heywood, 2014b). Heywood also actively encouraged the sentence-by-sentence 
approach that was dismissed by the Upper Tribunal for encouraging suspicion and distrust. 
The compromise provided a neat political solution that allowed the government to pacify 
the inquiry while maintaining the lawfulness of the Plowden refusal and any future refusal.  
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The Cabinet Minutes 
 
The second case concerns the minutes of Cabinet meetings held in Downing Street during 
March 2003 when the government took the decision to go to war. It was subsequently 
alleged, most vociferously by then-Secretary for International Development Clare Short, that 
Cabinet was prevented from properly scrutinising the legality, necessity and planning for war 
(Short, 2004). Twice, the minutes have been requested under the FOIA by Christopher 
Lamb, an information rights campaigner. On both occasions — in 2009 under Labour and 
2012 under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition — the Information Tribunal 
ordered the release of the minutes. On both occasions, the government used a veto power 
contained within the FOIA to override the judicial ruling.  
 
Both sides in the dispute relied on the conclusions of the Butler Review — an official inquiry 
held in 2004 — that criticised Blair’s preference for ‘sofa government’ (where decisions were 
made within a small group of advisors rather than the formal Cabinet). The state argued that 
the Butler Review had already investigated the matter. The review, however, was held in 
camera, did not publish any official documents, and was ambiguous as to whether the criticism 
applied specifically to March 2003. In favour of disclosing the Cabinet Minutes, Lamb, the 
Information Commission and a majority of the Information Tribunal argued that there was 
a clear public interest in disclosure so that the public could ‘make up its own mind’ on how 
decisions were taken in Cabinet (Ryan et al., 2009: 35; ICO 2012: 4).  
 
Rather than appeal the tribunal’s decision, the governments’ attorneys general twice exercised 
a power of veto contained in section 53 of the FOIA. This allows the government to use an 
‘executive override’ against a decision by the Information Commissioner or Information 
Tribunal in ‘exceptional circumstances’ (MOJ 2012). The government gave two 
interconnected justifications for using the veto.  The basis of the state’s objection was that 
the public interest in disclosure was outweighed by the risk of harm to the ‘formulation of 
Government Policy’ (section 35:1). Firstly, it was argued that Cabinet must make decisions 
through involve free, frank and fearless discussion. This requires Cabinet members to 
consider all possibilities and ‘not feel inhibited from advancing opinions that may be 
unpopular or controversial’ (Grieve, 2012: 3). The government warned that disclosure might 
discourage future speakers from expressing dissent for fear of being held to account for 
views later cast aside. Secondly, it was argued that the very act of publishing the minutes, 
even if the revelations were uncontroversial, would damage the possibilities for future 
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accountability: ‘Cabinet decision-making could increasingly be driven into more informal 
channels, with attendant dangers of a lack of rigour, lack of proper accountability, and lack 
of proper recording of decisions’ (Grieve, 2012: 4). While there is limited evidence of such a 
‘chilling effect’ as a result of FOI disclosure, the rhetoric is powerful (Hazell et al., 2010: 161-
180). Disclosure, the government claimed, would drive deliberation away from Cabinet and 
back to the sofas. There would be just as much secrecy, but these secrets would be off-the-
record mysteries that could never be retrieved. There would be more dark spaces that could 
hide iniquity and ineptitude, and thus greater insecurity. The public, on these terms, can have 
diluted minutes that can be disclosed but which would be useless for the purpose of holding 
government decision-making to account. Together, both justifications promise to protect 
liberal democracy: good quality deliberation on the one hand, and the preservation of the 
public record for future validity checks on the other.  
 
The government’s justification of the veto is reminiscent of the defence for ‘organisational 
privacy’ put forward by democratic theorists (Westin, 1967: 46). However, the justification 
for the veto deviates from this defence in two important respects. Firstly, transposing the 
government’s argument into Chambers’ language, the attorneys general are trying to protect 
Cabinet against the threat of plebiscitary reason. But the veto ignores the harm of private reason. 
The quality of public reason depends upon avoiding both harms, and neither supersedes the 
other. Like O’Donnell, the government justifies its veto through an identification of the 
harms of disclosure but ignores the opposing harms of non-disclosure. This argument was 
made in the House of Commons after the first veto in 2009 by David Howarth MP, who 
claimed that the greater threat to full and frank debate in Cabinet was not disclosure but the 
potential concealment of its demise: ‘[t]he argument against disclosure is … that discussion 
will take place informally… However, is not that precisely what happened under Mr Blair, 
with the rise of sofa government?’ (HC Deb 24 February 2009 c160). Rather than threaten 
frank debate, disclosure might show how it was overridden.  
 
Secondly, the government’s justification of the veto implies a paradox. We cannot know 
whether the quality of Cabinet deliberation was undermined in 2003 unless the minutes are 
published. But publication poses a risk of damaging future deliberation. This absurdity is the 
political version of Schrodinger’s cat - the public cannot ‘open the box’ to evaluate some 
policies and processes because the act itself may ‘kill’ the policy or process.  The papers may 
be disclosed after 30 years upon transfer to the National Archives, but could even then 
remain closed under similar exemptions. When the FOIA was introduced, the government 
stated that the veto should only be used in exceptional circumstances (HC Deb 4 April 2000 
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c918-923). Yet after the 2012 veto, the government confirmed that it would use the veto 
whenever the public interest in disclosure is ‘outweighed by the public interest in good 
Cabinet Government’ (MOJ, 2012). The Information Commissioner pointed out the bizarre 
implication: on paper, the veto is only to be used in exceptional circumstances, but in 
practice, the government has implied that it would routinely veto any judicial order for the 
disclosure of Cabinet minutes – indicating that Cabinet minutes, as a category of official 
information, can never actually be disclosed under FOI (Graham, 2012).  
 
This paradox also poses a problem for the deliberative democratic underpinnings of the 
UK’s information rights laws. The FOIA, as discussed in section one, broadly reflects the 
deliberative democratic argument that official information can only be kept secret when good 
reasons exist for the secret and the state could justify its behaviour in accordance with these 
reasons if called to do so. The veto suggests that this check cannot occur. 
 
This can be interpreted in one of two ways. First, this could be construed as a criticism of a 
deliberative democratic approach to state secrecy — that there are some liberal democratic 
secrets that the public cannot check. A second approach is to interpret the paradox as an 
indictment of the UK’s information rights legislation. The veto only makes sense according 
to a legislative framework that makes disclosure decisions by considering the harms of 
disclosure but not the harms of non-disclosure. The broad intention of the FOIA does reflect 
a deliberative democratic ethic — and the British state draws legitimacy from the suggestion 
that there is an assumption in favour of disclosure in the FOIA. The harm-based decision-
making framework, however, shows that this is not the case and that the framework is not 
consistent with a deliberative democratic approach. The law provides a loophole that allows 
the executive to keep exceptional secrets, but this exceptionalism simultaneously threatens 
to undo the liberal democratic character of the state. 
 
This interpretation is borne out by the government’s attempts to find a political fudge that 
allows the state to keep the Cabinet minutes a legal secret and preserve its liberal democratic 
identity. Just as it did for the Blair/Bush exchanges, Jeremy Heywood gave the Chilcot 
Inquiry permission to publish extracts of the Cabinet minutes. Chilcot already had access to 
the minutes and could argue for ‘particular and specific’ disclosure of the ‘precise wording’ 
of extracts to justify the inquiry’s conclusions (Heywood, 2014a). No FOIA applicant could 
have such an advantage. Heywood further told Chilcot that his decision was conditional on 
not creating any future precedent for FOI policy or FOI requests (Iraq Inquiry, 2016: 11). 
Several months later Lamb put Heywood’s compromise to the test by making a new FOI 
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request for the minutes, explicitly asking how the government’s previous justification for 
refusing disclosure (the likely harm to Cabinet deliberation and confidentiality) remained 
valid given the Cabinet Office had given the inquiry permission to publish extracts of the 
minutes. Surely Heywood’s decision, Lamb argued, ‘casts substantive doubt on the veracity 
of this contention when it was first used in order to refuse disclosure’ (cited in Cabinet 
Office, 2015). Both the government and a new Information Commissioner declined the 
request by repeating the argument that disclosure would harm the ‘stronger public interest’ 
in the ‘safe space’ of frank Cabinet discussion, but also by suggesting that the public’s 
understanding of the issue was better served by the inquiry’s mediated publication of extracts 
of the material, contextualised alongside the report.     
 
Conclusion: a new balance, or less security?  
 
Britain’s secrecy is made possible by a legal discourse that, paradoxically, emphasises the 
insecurity of the very thing it is intended to promote: disclosure. The law explicitly supposes 
that more disclosure equals more insecurity. That risk, moreover, is posed to liberal 
democratic concerns. This is the ingenuity of the discourse. It frames exceptional secrecy as 
something that protects against too much government (by preserving frank debate), not just 
too little government (by protecting the traditional concerns of state security).  Thus, the 
decision to withhold information does not appear as a curtailment of liberal democratic 
values but as a preservation of them. But this legal discourse is an impoverished way of 
deliberating questions of disclosure because relevant claims about the harms of secrecy are 
neglected. It also gives rise to problematic and paradoxical exceptional secrets - such as the 
Cabinet Minutes - which seem to undermine the foundations upon which legitimate liberal 
democratic state secrets are validated.  
 
This legal discourse is a common theme in FOI legislation across the world.  For example, 
the laws of the United Kingdom, United Statesiv, Swedenv, Germanyvi, New Zealandvii and 
the European Unionviii follow the same pattern: that disclosure can harm specific public 
interests, including harms to liberal democratic government; they grant authorities the power 
to judge those harms and to withhold information in order to mitigate these harms; and they do 
not explicitly state the potential harms of non-disclosure. These laws are also vague about the 
public interests for disclosure, or how disclosure benefits liberal democratic governmentix. 
 
One response to the problem would be to reformulate the law so that it also acknowledges 
the potential harms of secrecy. But this would easily produce an anti-political game of 
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security ‘trumps’, in which the victor of the dispute is she who can conjure up the most 
compelling projection of fear and insecurity (Neocleous, 2007: 146).  In such circumstances, 
claims to security become weightier than any other claim regarding rights and democracy.  
 
A more productive alternative would be to consider disputes in terms of the consequences 
for democracy rather than security (Bigo, 2010: 399). Presently, the law provides a list of 
public interests that can be harmed by disclosure and asks whether the harm outweighs a 
public interest in the norm of disclosure. Instead, an alternative test could start with public 
interests such as deliberative justice and accountability, and asks whether those interests are 
best served by disclosure or continued concealment. Doing so may highlight that many 
security-based arguments can have a damaging effect on a democratic polity. This applies 
equally to Benthamite, security-based arguments for disclosure, which tends toward 
totalitarianism and violence just as much as excessive secrecy (Birchall, 2011a).  
 
The law’s insufficient consideration of the benefits of disclosure, paradoxically, intensifies 
the potential harms of transparency, not just secrecy. There is more to democracy than the 
act of disclosure.  Through FOI, politics risks being reduced to ‘a drama of concealment and 
revelation’ (Birchall, 2011b: 135), to which this paper is perhaps complicit. Necessary 
disclosure should politicize something so that it is deliberated upon (Gilbert, 2007: 38). When 
the Chilcot Inquiry released redacted versions of the secret material, the revelations 
confirmed the failures in democratic accountability that many already suspected. Blair 
promised Bush that he would be with him ‘whatever’; Cabinet was not consulted on 
important decisions about the war (Iraq Inquiry, 2016). But before and after this revelation, 
the problem was the same: a public value in the precautionary avoidance of insecurity (which 
also underpins FOI law), was given greater attention than other values, such as deliberative 
justice (Ralph, 2011). Such concerns can only be addressed by understanding how disclosure 
helps a democracy to scrutinise and learn from its failures, e.g. by some legal 
acknowledgment that disclosure can, in moderation, safeguard fearless speech - which, if 
present in Cabinet at the time, could have challenged the post-9/11 fusion doctrine that 
justified the war. This cannot occur while the law is vague about the democratic benefits of 
disclosure but definite about its dangers.  
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i See ‘Concluding remarks’ for more details 
ii The FOIA distinguishes between two types of qualified exemption: ‘prejudiced-based’ and 
‘class-based’. Both encourage the authority to oppose disclosure based on harms that would 
or would likely result. In prejudice-based exemptions, the harm is specified. The authority need 
only show how that harm is posed by disclosure in the specific instance in question (e.g. 
‘harm to international relations’ from disclosing diplomatic exchanges, section 27(1) – see 
‘Blair/Bush Exchanges’). In class-based exemptions, the authority show why disclosure of 
information from a particular class (e.g. information related to the formulation of government 
policy’) would a harm the public interest (see section 35(1) and this paper on ‘Cabinet 
Minutes’). 
iii By July 2016, c. 1,800 documents had been published with redactions on the Inquiry 
website. 7,000 documents were partially disclosed in the final report through extracts or 
summaries (Chilcot, 2016).   
iv See the United States’ Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. 
v See chapter 2, article 1 of Sweden’s Freedom of the Press Act. 
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vi See section 3 of Germany’s Freedom of Information Act (2005). 
vii See section 9 of the Official Information Act (1982) 
viii See article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
ix New Zealand’s law does state that disclosure is intended to enable effective public 
participation in public affairs and to promote the accountability of ministers and officials 
(section 4), but these interests are nevertheless not equal to the harm-based reasons for 
concealment.  
